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Abstract     
This paper1 explores workers’ experiences of job quality in two economic sectors: 
manufacturing and knowledge industries. Drawing on comparative empirical research 
from three case studies in Poland, the UK and Belgium, it highlights tensions between 
the EU aspiration for ‘more and better jobs’ and the flexible strategies of companies 
reacting to market pressures. The objective of this paper is to explore employment 
security in the country context and to consider how organizations deliver job security in 
terms of workers’ contractual status and its effects on job quality. 
                                                     
1 The paper is a collaborative effort by members of Marie Curie Changing Employment Programme, Theme 3 “Employee 
Wellbeing and Work Life Quality”, and presents the initial findings of three research projects conducted within Theme 3.  
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Introduction 
It is claimed that not only job creation, but also the quality of those jobs, contributes to economic 
sustainability, social cohesion and individual well-being (European Commission, 2001). While the 
objective of raising job quality has been prominent, progress towards this aim has been challenged by 
wider external factors. The processes of globalization, financialization and technological change in 
combination with the effects of the economic crisis have led to growing pressure for the flexibilization 
of labour markets. In the EU, flexibility for employers is balanced by a set of prescribed ‘securities’ for 
employees in the concept known as ‘flexicurity’. However, there is a growing consensus that 
institutional changes that have taken place under this policy are biased towards increasing various 
forms of flexibility for employers while lowering levels of job quality and its polarization (Gallie, 2013). 
Where there have been recoveries they have either been poor in number of jobs, or rich in low 
productivity and bad-quality jobs (Carré et al., 2012). Little is known about the strategies practised by 
organizations as they respond to the market and political pressures, shaping the experiences of job 
quality for employees. 
 
This paper first examines job quality as a concept, together with the major analytical approaches to it, 
and draws attention to how debates focusing on institutional frameworks do not entirely explain the 
changing drivers of job quality at an organizational level.  
 
Second, the paper presents qualitative research evidence from three case studies in three countries 
representing two different manufacturing sectors and the software industry. Using the spirits industry 
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in Scotland, commercial transport vehicle manufacturing in Poland, and information and 
communication technologies (ICT) work in Belgium, the paper shows, for each country, the 
institutional framework of employment security within which the companies build strategies to remain 
competitive and flexible.  
 
Third, the paper considers emerging patterns of employment dualization – the segregation of workers 
into groups with different forms of contracts. It shows how, within the same employment security 
arrangements, workers can experience different job-security and job-quality outcomes at the sectoral 
and organizational level. 
Analytical Framework 
 
Job Quality 
There is no consensual definition of job quality. Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2011) argue that its 
multidimensional nature has made this concept difficult to analyse in precise terms. Economists look 
at wage differentials; psychologists explore motivational aspects (Warr and Clapperton, 2009); and 
sociologists look at skills, task discretion and autonomy (Kalleberg, 2011; Kelliher and Anderson, 2008). 
Job quality can be analysed subjectively, by exploring what workers value in jobs, or objectively, by 
focusing on the features of the job itself (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it is agreed, 
“jobs do not exist in a vacuum, but in a social context in which there are public and private institutions 
like a welfare state and the family” (ibid: 457). These external factors may have a positive or negative 
impact on job quality. The dimensions commonly included in job quality discussions are pay, intrinsic 
quality of work (skills, autonomy, powerfulness, meaningfulness and social support), employment 
quality (job security and development opportunities), health and safety, and work–life balance 
(working time and work intensity) (Muñoz de Bustillo et al, 2011).  
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Debate on job quality has also been framed in wider institutional differences, including Varieties of 
Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and Employment Regimes (Gallie, 2007). These approaches try to 
explain job quality using different economic paradigms at the European level, influenced by 
institutional frameworks (Holman, 2013). Despite the existence of an overarching European 
employment strategy (European Commission, 2007), workers in different countries are integrated into 
work-regulation institutions to differing extents. The employment regimes perspective (Gallie, 2007) is 
relevant for this paper as it allows for more detailed distinctions between institutional frameworks 
across European countries. The perspective is rooted in welfare-regime theory (Gallie, 2013): ‘Nordic 
systems’ aim to protect the workforce with strict employment regulations and high levels of welfare 
generosity (e.g., Sweden); ‘continental systems’ include countries with different levels of employment 
regulation but relatively high levels of welfare generosity (e.g., Belgium); in ‘liberal systems’ working 
conditions depend primarily on market power, with weak employment protection and low welfare 
generosity (e.g., the UK); ‘southern systems’ have little state intervention in the regulation of working 
conditions (e.g., Portugal); and ‘transitional systems’ are claimed to have relatively little state 
intervention in the regulation of working conditions, coupled with low welfare generosity (e.g., 
Poland). Gallie (2007) argues that ever greater international competition and more volatile product 
markets are increasingly influencing internal labour markets as companies look for more flexibility.  
 
According to the dualization approach, which extends the job quality debate, the labour market is 
divided into two major segments – core and peripheral workforce, which differ in terms of job 
security, wages, opportunities for skills development, and social rights (Davidson and Naczyk, 2009; 
Palier and Thelen, 2010). The dominant approaches to dualization argue that: the globalization of 
markets and consequent competition requires firms to adopt ever more flexible practices (McGovern 
et al., 2007; Kalleberg, 2011); structural changes in the economy that are based on technological 
advances, the decline of industry and the rise of the service sector, have led to a growth in atypical 
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forms of employment (Castells, 2010); and in the regulation of the labour market and the welfare 
state, it is political actors that set the institutional context for labour-market behaviour, such as 
enabling or constraining the use of temporary contracts and temporary agency work, or the ease or 
difficulty of hiring and firing employees (Gash and Inanc, 2013).  
  
Although these approaches can be useful in understanding how institutional settings affect the 
differences in job quality between countries and between groups of workers (Gallie, 2013; Holman, 
2013), what is happening in the workplace may remain a ‘black box’, as they treat firms as equal and 
ignore the many differences between firms with similar features that operate in the same contextual 
framework. Moreover, employment relationships and work organization strategies, such as 
implementing practices related to flexible employment, occur at firm level. Therefore, this paper aims 
to shed light on how institutional frameworks feed into the organizational level, and impact on the 
outcomes in terms of job quality. By introducing the organizational level into the analysis while paying 
attention to the institutional context, this paper explores additional drivers, such as market forces, and 
creates a more comprehensive picture of the factors influencing job quality. Nevertheless, in the next 
section this paper focus on the current European institutional framework, the principal aspiration of 
which was to shape the quality of employment and jobs across European countries, but which ended 
up creating the conditions for an ever more polarized labour market. 
 
Flexicurity and Job Quality 
The leading European employment strategy has been the policy of flexicurity, one of the aims of which 
is to raise job quality in Europe (Dieckhoff and Gallie, 2007: 487–490). The combination of security for 
employees and flexibility for employers is achieved by promoting elements of employment and social 
security policy, such as flexibilization of work contracts, lifelong learning, active labour-market policies 
and social security systems for support during periods of unemployment (European Commission, 
2007). Critics of flexicurity discourse have pointed out that the objectives of this policy are mutually 
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incompatible and that it thus lends itself to the advocates of labour-market deregulation (Burroni and 
Keune, 2011). It is now acknowledged that the emphasis on flexibility, highlighted by the European 
economic crisis, has aggravated the trend towards labour-market polarization, where atypical forms of 
employment play a crucial role (Eurofound, 2012; Gallie, 2013). Although addressing job quality issues 
through the frame of flexicurity tends to produce a narrow formulation of job quality centred on 
employment security and job security (Smith et al., 2008), these issues are seen here as proxies for 
other job quality dimensions. 
 
Research Framework 
For the purposes of this paper, employment security will be analysed in different contexts to 
understand how companies take advantage of wider institutional frameworks and use different forms 
of contracts in order to adapt to economic and market variations. The paper explores how these 
dynamics influence other dimensions of job quality such as the intensification of work, autonomy, task 
discretion and skills development and usage. Employment security describes the ease of hiring and 
firing of an individual by companies, and the extent of social protection from the state for the 
unemployed (Körner et al., 2009; Davoine and Ehrel, 2006). It is operationalized through the 
combination of employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment insurance benefits (UIB), 
using the definitions given by the OECD (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). The EPL index reflects the level 
of employment protection provided by statutory law and collective agreements in different countries. 
Greater employment protection is thought to reduce the permeability of the barrier between work 
and unemployment, discouraging both hiring and firing (Clark and Vinay, 2009). The UIB index is the 
level of social protection in terms of benefits that individuals get when unemployed, such as training, 
employment incentives, sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation, and out-of-work 
income maintenance and support (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009).  
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Table 1 shows the research framework as a matrix representing employment security at a national 
level, following Gallie’s (2013) framework. This is operationalized using two OECD indices: (i)  EPL, 
which is how far employees with regular and temporary contracts are protected from dismissal; and 
(ii) UIB generosity, which is the percentage of public expenditure on labour-market programmes that 
support unemployed individuals in a smooth and rapid transition between jobs (OECD 2015; Clark and 
Vinay, 2008). Thus the employment security of a case-study country can be described according to EPL 
and UIB levels. The boxes at the intersection of these two indices represent particular groups of 
workers, taking into consideration their contractual status – permanent or temporary.  
Table 1: Research framework 
 UIB high UIB low 
EPL high 1.  
Case study 3: ICT workers in 
Belgium 
3.  
Case study 2 (CommerTrans): permanent and temporary 
workers in Poland 
EPL low 2.  4.  
Case study 1 (SpiritsCo): permanent and temporary 
workers in the UK 
Notes EPL: employment protection legislation; UIB: unemployment insurance benefits 
Case Study Countries and Employment Security Contexts 
The United Kingdom, Poland, and Belgium are represented in the three case studies analysed in this 
paper. Each of these countries is situated in the research framework on the basis of its employment 
security according to the OECD indices EPL (Figure 1) and UIB (Figure 2).  
 
The UK scores low on both EPL and UIB. Employees with regular contracts can easily be fired, and it is 
easy for companies to hire and use workforces with temporary contracts. Support for the unemployed 
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is weak. Employees with both permanent and temporary forms of contract are placed in cell 4 of Table 
1.  
 
Belgium scores high on both EPL and UIB indices. There are strict restrictions on the firing of 
employees with regular contracts, and on the use of temporary labour. The unemployed enjoy 
relatively high levels of support from the welfare system. Therefore, employees in case study 3 are 
located in cell 1 of Table 1.  
 
In Poland, the EPL indicator is moderately strict for both permanent and temporary contracts while 
the UIB support is weak for the unemployed population. Permanent and temporary employees in case 
study 2 are both placed in cell 3. 
 
This interpretation matches, to some extent, Gallie’s (2013) employment regimes categorization. The 
UK exemplifies a ‘liberal system’ with weak employment protection and welfare generosity; Belgium 
represents a ‘continental system’ with strict employment regulation and high levels of welfare 
generosity; Poland is a ‘transitional system’, although there are some differences from Gallie’s 
argument in that, rather than low state intervention, the OECD measures for statutory employment 
regulation reflect relatively strict protection levels for all employees. However, the actual protection 
level for employees here may be affected by problematic state enforcement combined with weak 
trade unions (McKay et al., 2012).  
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Job security can be understood as an individual dimension involving a cognitive factor – estimation of 
the likelihood of losing one’s job or affective-factor worry about losing one’s job (Greenhalgh and 
Rosenblatt, 1984). Here it is considered as an organizational mechanism in the face of volatile and 
uncertain market demands (Hudson, 2002). In order to achieve flexibility, companies often hire 
individuals on temporary, fixed-term or part-time contracts (Hudson, 2002); labour casualization and 
cost reduction are thus achieved by externalizing the bureaucratic control to temporary work 
agencies, which has a detrimental impact on the quality of jobs (Kalleberg, 2011).  
 
Using the logic of flexicurity, the risk of job loss should be mitigated by the promise of employment 
security and support in the form of transitions from job to unemployment and back with opportunities 
for lifelong learning, active labour-market policies and financial support through social security 
systems. However, workers are embedded in different contexts of work regulation to different extents 
and thus exposed to different market pressures making them more or less vulnerable (Gallie, 2007). 
Due to the economic crisis which has weakened welfare state mechanisms and decreased labour-
market opportunities, employees face a two-fold risk to their well-being – insecurity can itself act as a 
stress factor through lack of control over a critical aspect of life (Virtanen et al., 2013) but also often 
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results in the transfer of risk from employer to employee (McGovern et al., 2007). Haidinger and 
Flecker (2015) demonstrate that the peripheral workforce usually bears the costs of highly flexible 
employment relations. The fear of losing jobs forces individuals to comply with increasingly 
demanding management mechanisms that extract more effort from workers (Taylor, 2013). 
 
Individuals from the case studies have, in principle, different experiences of job quality for two 
reasons: (i) the employment security context in which they are embedded; and (ii) the level of job 
security they have with the employer. The approach taken in this paper allows us to explore how 
institutional systems impact organizations and affect individuals by shaping their job quality. 
 
Description of Case Study Organizations and Research Approach 
 
Case study 1 - Scottish Spirits Company in the UK 
The Scottish spirits industry employs around 45,000 workers directly and indirectly in the UK, (Scottish 
Whisky Association, (SWA), 2013). The quality aspect of the product means the industry is self-
regulating. Scotch whisky is only labelled as such when it has been matured and bottled solely in 
Scotland (Food (The Scottish Whisky Regulations) Order, 2009). 
 
The company analysed, SpiritsCo, is a privately owned multinational involved in every stage of 
production – cooperage, distilling, maturation, bottling and packaging – and is one of the four leading 
Scottish spirits producers. Shop-floor workers are well remunerated (compared to those in the 
industry and elsewhere in Glasgow for the same type of job), and receive a generous pension scheme 
and training programme, so the company is considered a good employer. This case study focus on the 
bottling and packaging site, which is located in Glasgow and employs around 200 shop-floor workers. 
The data was gathered at the bottling site, where 27 semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
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managers, core and peripheral workers, and shop stewards, as well as three focus groups with middle 
and senior managers. SpiritsCo’s bottling site is known for high commitment/performance practices, 
such as weekly team meetings for problem solving, a partnership deal with the local trade union, 
emphasis on employee engagement and long-term relationships with them. The recent market 
expansion in the spirits industry has resulted in SpiritsCo’s management seeking greater flexibility, 
which is operationalized in terms of utilizing different forms of employment contracts, multiple shifts, 
and multitasking teams. This functional and numerical flexibility of labour is used to adjust production 
to the increasing demand and is suited to the unpredictability that typifies the spirits industry. 
 
The workers contracted by SpiritsCo are employed on a permanent or temporary basis. The 
percentage of casual labour varies, reaching 60 % of the total workforce in more demanding periods 
of production. Around 80 % of the permanent workforce is unionized. The permanent workforce is 
divided into two types of contracts: ‘core full-time’ and ‘core-flexi’ workers. The latter were 
introduced to increase flexibility and to eliminate overtime that was being paid to full-time workers, 
opening up more vacancies to give temporary staff the opportunity to apply for permanent positions. 
It also fitted the ‘good employer’ image.  The core full-time workers are employed on a full-time (38 
hours) and permanent basis, whereas the core-flexi workers are employed on a zero-hours and 
permanent basis. The number of hours that the core-flexi workers work in one year is decided at the 
beginning of each year according to the forecast production demand, from 0 to 30 hours a week. This 
allows management to keep core-flexi workers at home during periods of lower production demand 
usually at the beginning of the year), and bring them back to the plant site in ‘rush periods’ (from April 
to December), when they make up for the hours they have not worked. 
 In some cases, the long-term employer–employee relationship is applied to the temporary workforce. 
SpiritsCo employs temporary workers directly and emphasizes that most of them are employed year 
after year even if only for a few months. This saves the company on training costs and time, and gives 
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the opportunity for individuals to have a decent paid job once a year. Temporary workers are 
recruited preferably from within the area where the bottling site is located, which is an area with low 
job opportunities. According to the interviewees, the majority of temporary workers have been 
experiencing long-term or various periods of unemployment. This company’s  temporary recruitment 
strategy creates two major dynamics that relate to the EPL and UIB.  First, employment regulation in 
the UK allows the use of temporary work with almost no restrictions, at the same time creating a very 
weak contractual relationship between employer and employee, even as regards permanent 
contracts. According to Gash and Inanc (2013), hiring and firing permanent and temporary employees 
in the UK is equally easy due to the low levels of regulation of temporary and permanent employment. 
Second, the combination of workers’ low skill level, the limited financial support provided by the 
welfare state to unemployed individuals, and the high unemployment rate in Glasgow,2 results in huge 
pressure to go back to the job in an area with few employment alternatives. 
  
Case study 2 - Commercial Transport Vehicle Manufacturing in Poland 
At company level, permanent contracts can be regarded as too protective for employees, since they 
preclude changes in the level of the workforce in response to market pressures. Flexible forms of 
employment were therefore introduced in Poland to reduce the unemployment rate and to enable 
more flexibility for employers. There has been a rapid increase in atypical types of contract: short-term 
contracts, temporary agency work, civil contracts and self-employment. About 24 % of all employment 
in Poland is carried out on short-term contracts, the highest rate in the EU (Trappman, 2011). Unlike 
civil contracts and (bogus) self-employment, which are not covered by labour law and offer very 
limited social security provision, there are relatively strict legal limitations on temporary forms of work 
such as agency work – equal treatment clauses, restrictions on the use of agency workers around 
certain environmental hazards and limitations on consecutive contracts. Temporary contracts differ 
from permanent contracts in the notice period (2 weeks instead of 3 months) and the fewer 
                                                     
2 In 2015 Glasgow was the jobless capital of the UK, with no one employed in 30.2% of households (Source: ONS). 
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opportunities for unemployment benefits, which are calculated on the basis of tenure (at least 6 
months of employment to be entitled to benefit, 80 % benefit if the tenure is less than 5 years). Even 
though on paper temporary agency work seems to be a rather protected form of atypical work, it is 
still short term and easily cancelled, leading to low job security and insecurity during unemployment. 
Although a third consecutive short-term contract with one employer should automatically be 
converted to permanent status, temporary work agencies often transfer workers between themselves 
in order to avoid having to employ them permanently. Temporary agency workers have no trade 
union representation, as trade union regulations are incompatible with the triangular relation 
between the company, the agency and the workers. 
 
 Poland is the third-largest producer of commercial transport vehicles in Europe. CommerTrans, a 
Polish subsidiary of a publicly owned multinational manufacturing company, is one of the biggest in its 
sector. In the mid-1990s the company acquired production facilities in Poland, continuing a similar 
type of production, and taking over existing personnel and trade union organization. For case study 2, 
eight interviews were carried out with line managers, HR representatives and permanent and 
temporary workers in CommerTrans. 
 
CommerTrans prides itself both on adopting a high-road strategy in product quality and in employee 
relations, emphasizing its corporate social responsibility policies. The production system includes  lean 
production elements – high performance through cross-functional teamwork, a focus on value-adding 
processes, just-in-time principles, continuous improvement, eliminating errors at source and using 
quantitative data to monitor progress. Organizational policies cover open dialogue, engagement, 
development opportunities and respect for the individual. CommerTrans prides itself on safe working 
conditions and strict adherence to all legislative requirements. General guideline targets for workforce 
flexibility are provided by the headquarters while local workplace regulations concerning pay, hours, 
 P
ag
e1
4
 
and use of the flexible workforce are negotiated with company-level trade union representation. 
Temporal, financial, functional and numerical flexibility of labour are used to adjust production 
capacity to production needs in a product market that is characterized by heavy competition and 
volatility. 
 
 To achieve numerical flexibility, the company has contracts with three temporary work agencies. 
There are about 1350 production employees, approximately 20 % of whom are hired through 
temporary work agencies (a threshold of 15 % negotiated with the trade union was exceeded at the 
time of the interviews). About 50 % of the directly hired production employees are unionized 
(temporary agency workers are not unionized). Temporary work agencies are strategically used for 
recruitment – the only way into the organization for a lower-skilled production worker is on a 
temporary agency contract lasting from a month to a year, but which cannot exceed 18 months by 
law. It is agreed that if the company-wide threshold for agency workers is exceeded, some agency 
temps will be offered temporary contracts with the company itself, but it is extremely unusual for  
these types of contracts to be converted to permanent contracts with the company. Most often 
temporary workers’ contracts are not renewed after the two consecutive contracts permitted by law, 
and they are replaced by new temporary hires. This approach is justified by the high protection level 
of regular permanent employment in Poland. The voluntary turnover in the company is low and 
average tenure high; letting go of permanent employees is time-consuming, expensive, includes union 
negotiations and carries the risk of ‘negative publicity’.  
 
Case study 3:  ICT Sector in Belgium 
The third case study concerns Belgian IT workers: software developers and infrastructure workers 
(networking and system administration). It is based on interview data gathered from 25 interviews 
with people working in software development or network administration in various companies.  The 
strategic role of the ICT sector in market globalization continues to strengthen in the national 
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economies of the most industrialized countries. This sector continues to record profound growth 
rates. As shown in Table 2, according to the ‘barometer of the information society’ published by the 
Belgian Ministry of Economy in 2014, the total number of companies active in Belgium’s ICT sector in 
2013 was 36,057, an increase of 20.2 % compared with 2008 despite the Great Recession. 
Significantly, the only sub-sector where there is a decline in the number of companies is the industrial 
branch of the ICT sector.  
 
Most Belgian ICT companies are situated in the service sector. In 2013, according to Belgian Social 
Security, out of a total of 3.8 million employees, 73,422 worked in ICT, representing 1.9 % of the total; 
3.25 % of Belgian employees possess specialized ICT skills.  
Table 2: Number of companies in the Belgian ICT sector 
 Nace 2008 2013 Change in % 
Manufacture of computer, electronic 
and optical products 
26 577 545 -5.55 
Wholesale  information and 
communication equipment 
46,5 1 660 1 777 7.05 
Software publishing 58,2 569 560 -1.58 
Telecommunications 61 5 403 6 189 14.55 
Computer programming, consultancy 
and related activities 
62 19 445 23 454 20.62 
Data processing, hosting and related 
activities; web portals 
63,1 1 458 2 594 77.91 
Repair of computers and 
communication equipment 
95,1 875 938 7.20 
Total  29 986 36 057 20.25 
Source: Belgian Ministry of Economy (2014) 
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Table 3: Employment by enterprise size class, computer programming, consultancy and related activities (NACE 
Division 62) 
  Total SMEs Micro Small Medium-sized Large 
  (thousands) (% of total) 
EU-27 2 614.8 67.1 28.2 20.0 18.9 32.9 
Belgium 65.1 75.1 37.0 19.5 18.6 24.9 
Source: Eurostat 2012 
 
Table 3 shows that in 2012 (the most recent year for which data are available) 78.6 % of the Belgian 
workforce in computer programming, consultancy and related activities worked in small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), companies with fewer than 250 people. This is higher than the EU-28 average and 
has mostly to do with the relatively large number of micro-sized companies with fewer than 10 people 
working in them. In table 2 we can see that 65 % of the Belgian ICT sector was involved in computer 
programming, consultancy and related activities. It may be estimated that most software developers 
are employed as consultants in micro-sized companies or are self-employed. The nature of the work 
requires rather small teams of 5–10 people working on a project. This work can range from functional 
analysis of a customer’s needs to deciding on a technological course of action in a technical analysis, 
translating this into modules of programming code, and finally actually coding and bug testing, usually 
but not always in contact with the customer.  
 
This is also reflected in the employment practices in the sector: while there are employees on fixed or 
permanent contracts, as in every sector, the number of self-employed people increased from 600 in 
2002 to 3100 in 2012 (Belgian Ministry of Economy 2012). A large proportion of ICT workers are also 
employed through consulting firms and work on a project-by-project basis. Nine of the 25 
interviewees work on this basis. Formally employed on fixed or permanent contracts, in reality they 
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change their workplace from once every two years to as often as three or four times a year. Turnover 
and rate of  job change are also quite high.  
Case Analysis  
This paper presents initial findings about how companies organize work around job security in order to 
achieve flexibility within a framework of employment security; it also explores how that impacts on job 
quality outcomes. The analysis starts with the form of contract and follows the consequences on two 
levels where job quality can be studied: the organizational level where skills, training and corporate 
culture are reviewed; and the individual level where employees, having regard to their job security 
and job quality, determine their strategies regarding engagement in work and other labour-market 
options. Both levels function in the context of EPL and UIB regulations. 
 
Job Quality in a Scottish Spirits Company 
At SpiritsCo, temporary and permanent (full-time and core-flexi) workers are integrated in the same 
teams regardless of their form of contract; their pay is equal, and they work the same hours in the 
three existing shifts. Nevertheless,  segmentation of the workforce can clearly be seen on site in two 
ways. The first relates to contractual typology, with both groups of permanent employees enjoying 
long periods of job tenure, while the temporary workers are employed on a very short-term and 
casual basis. The second way relates to skills utilization and development. 
 
 The permanent workforce perceive their jobs as very secure, admitting that someone would “have to 
commit murder, seriously, to be sacked” (permanent shop-floor worker). SpiritsCo wants to be 
perceived as an employee-friendly company that does not want to lay off employees. Despite the 
weak employment security (EPL and UIB), permanent workers do not feel vulnerable to 
unemployment. The company’s approach to permanent employees shelters them from a weak 
welfare state. 
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 The job quality outcomes are different for permanent full-time and permanent core-flexi workers. 
Although pay and pay-related schemes are equal, according to interviewees the core-flexi workers 
were “pushed into” a greater variety of tasks, which meant more effort and flexibility. To adapt to 
market demands and rising overtime costs, SpiritsCo implemented more shifts. After negotiations with 
the trade union, in addition to the normal day shift (7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m.) management introduced a 
permanent twilight shift (4.30 p.m. to 11.30 p.m.), and night shift (10.00 p.m. to 7.30 a.m.). The 
allocation of employees to the different shifts depends on the skills needed on a particular shift. An 
individual with more skills is more likely to be allocated to the twilight and night shifts where high 
functional flexibility is required. This restructuring of working hours resulted in further segmentation 
of the workforce and more varied job quality outcomes in terms of both hours of work, and skills 
utilization and development. Employees on core-flexi contracts wait to be called in for the more 
demanding production periods, when they work different shifts and have to make up their hours. They 
work up to 10 or 12 hours on different shifts, depending on production requirements. According to 
the interviews, these patterns of work result in a skewed work–life balance, sleep deprivation, and 
sometimes exhaustion. Skills development also depends on production requirements. If management 
needs more people to be trained on a specific machine, core-flexi workers will go on a training course 
to develop the specific skill required. This contrasts with full-time workers who are on a fixed shift 
(usually the day shift) and can request training themselves. This means that full-time workers have 
control over their skills development, and consequently over which tasks and shifts they will be 
allocated to. 
 
Pay conditions for the temporary workforce are equal to those of permanent workers, but their 
contractual link to SpiritsCo is much weaker. Individuals can be hired for a minimum of two weeks, 
their contract can be extended according to production requirements, and they can be laid off at a 
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week’s notice. According to the interviewees this creates a sense of uncertainty when the “rush 
period” is coming to an end. SpiritsCo management argues that because individuals come back to 
work every year they are able to develop a significant range of skills. Employees and shop stewards 
report that the skill level of temporary workers is generally lower than that of permanent workers. 
However managers acknowledge that the training opportunities are not the same for temporary and 
permanent workers. SpiritsCo is not interested in investing in training people employed on a short-
term basis, and therefore newly hired temporary workers are trained on the job to do the specific task 
they were hired for; the long-term temporary workers do not receive any training because they are 
already trained on the machines, tasks, culture and premises of SpiritsCo. Despite temporary workers’ 
weak relationship with SpiritsCo they want to come back to work for the company the following year 
because the wages there are higher than in other companies in Glasgow. This unbalanced 
employment relationship allows the company to take advantage of temporary workers. The 
performance assessment system encourages temporary workers to develop further skills (handling 
forklifts and specific packaging machines) outside the company when unemployed. Most temporary 
employees emphasized that getting training during such periods was key to coming back to work for 
SpiritsCo the next year and to eventually getting a permanent contract. SpiritsCo thus externalized the 
training effort and responsibility to individuals. 
 
The case of SpiritsCo highlights the connection between the company’s need for flexibility and the 
consequences in terms of segmentation of the workforce and individuals’ job quality. For the workers, 
the use of flexibility as an organizational strategy decreases the quality of jobs. The low EPL and the 
weak social security in the UK serve to highlight poor aspects of employment and work conditions for 
both groups of workers. 
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Job Quality in Commercial Vehicle Manufacturing 
In Poland both permanent and temporary employees can be placed in the high EPL-low UIB quadrant 
and in CommerTrans they share such aspects of job quality as pay, hours of work and work 
environment. Nevertheless, there are critical differences in job quality relating to skills development 
and job security. There is a clear division between permanent workers with long tenure and high skills, 
and temporary agency workers on short-term contracts with low opportunities for skills development.  
 
Employees on permanent contracts are protected through high EPL as well as their specific skill set. 
CommerTrans seeks skills that are in short supply in the labour market and devotes significant time to 
training. According to the interviewees it takes almost two years for an employee to be fully qualified 
to work according to company standards. CommerTrans emphasizes its unique corporate culture, 
which plays a crucial role in achieving the necessary level of excellence in performance. As the process 
of internalization of corporate values and norms takes time and is viewed as an investment, 
permanent employees are considered a valuable resource and their attitudes are regularly monitored 
through employee engagement surveys. Although the overall benefits package on offer is low, 
permanent employees get higher and longer-lasting benefits compared with temporary workers. In 
conditions of high EPL and generally low UIB, the level of skills and knowledge of values, along with the 
protective regulations attached to the permanent employment contract, enhance the job quality of 
permanent employees in CommerTrans. 
 
Temporary agency workers are placed in the high EPL-low UIB quadrant due to restrictive statutory 
regulation, but their working lives differ from those of permanent colleagues. Most contracts used in 
CommerTrans are for periods of between one and six months to retain the necessary level of 
flexibility. If the two consecutive contracts allowed by law have been used up, there are the legal 
options of termination of the employment contract or signing a direct contract with the user firm, as 
well as the semi-legal option to transfer the worker between ‘friendly’ temporary work agencies while 
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retaining the same user firm. Even though the latter is not common practice in CommerTrans, the 
direct hire of agency workers is very rare – only the very best can get temporary direct contracts and 
transfers to permanent direct contracts are practically unheard of. Due to the short tenure and lower 
skill base, temporary workers are assigned to jobs that require lower skills and neither the agency nor 
the user firm is motivated to provide them with long-term competency development. None of the 
parties in this triangular relationship is prepared to invest in the internalization of corporate culture, 
and agency workers are not involved in engagement surveys. 
 
The high level of EPL has ambiguous consequences for both company and workers in Poland. The 
company implements the headquarters’ targets on workforce flexibility while aiming for an 
‘employee-friendly’ image, by not laying off the permanent workforce when orders decrease. This 
trade-off also creates difficulties. Managers are aware that if temporary workers on two weeks’ notice 
are not satisfied, they can easily seek jobs elsewhere. Interviewees pointed out that temporary 
workers make more mistakes and do not have a vested interest in teamwork, which is considered a 
bad example for permanent workers. 
 
From the employees’ point of view CommerTrans is the employer of choice in the area – pace and 
intensity of work and managerial control can be far higher elsewhere. Temporary agency workers are 
aware that opportunities to switch from agency contracts to direct employment  are scarce, and that 
the only option is a temporary direct contract. Their low level of engagement may be seen as a 
strategy for dealing with low job security by distancing oneself; there is little to compete for in terms 
of performance excellence. Nevertheless, they return for consecutive contracts, as CommerTrans is 
the best prospect in comparison with low UIB and other labour-market offers. 
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The case of CommerTrans shows the connection between job quality and flexibility in a situation 
where, even though two groups of employees are both exposed to relatively high levels of EPL (albeit 
with different standards) and low UIB, the organizational strategies based on available legal provisions 
have led to further dualization of working conditions. Permanent workers’ job security is enhanced by 
continuing skills development and protection from dismissal, whereas temporary agency workers have 
few opportunities for skills development, little hope of a more secure contract and limited options for 
unemployment benefits once the temporary contracts end. The use of flexible work patterns to adjust 
production capacity has led to increased security for permanent workers for whom temporary 
workers act as a buffer, while those same temporary workers are trapped in an insecure working 
future. 
Job Quality in the ICT Sector 
The case study presents an ICT sector with two defining features. The first is a tight labour market: all 
indicators point to a shortage of skilled labour in the Belgian ICT sector. According to Agoria (2015), 
the Belgian employers’ organization for the technology sector, there are about 4000 job vacancies 
which take a very long time to fill, if they are filled at all. According to the Flemish labour consultancy 
and platform, there are 6438 long-term vacancies (VDAB, 2015). Its Wallonian counterpart Forem 
reported 1052 such vacancies (Forem, 2013), while the Brussels Observatory of Employment reported 
496 such vacancies for the city of Brussels (Actiris, 2013). Recall that in Table 3 the number of people 
employed in the Belgian ICT sector stood at 65,100, so the hard-to-fill vacancies represent a significant 
percentage of the total employment in the sector.  
Table 4: ICT specialists, statistics on hard-to-fill vacancies in enterprises in 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat (2015) 
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As table 4 shows, in 2015 8 % of EU enterprises recruited or tried to recruit ICT specialists, and of 
these, 38 %  reported difficulties in filling vacancies. For Belgium, numbers in the categories ‘employ 
ICT specialists’, ‘hard-to-fill vacancies’ and ‘training to other persons’ deviate from the European 
average.  
 
The second defining feature is the constant uncertainty about which skills to learn or maintain in order 
to remain employable, given that technology changes at an increasing rate, especially when measured 
over an entire career. According to some interviews this is a real fear, as not being sent out on 
projects by your consultancy firm can be a real problem career-wise. To cite an analyst/consultant: 
“standing still in my sector is the same as moving backwards”. This is an external pressure beyond the 
worker’s control, which makes it weigh more heavily. According to the interviewees, the question for a 
great many ICT workers becomes whether they should stay with their current employer, gaining more 
responsibility through the years and building a stable career in one place, or change employer 
frequently, building up a broad portfolio of skills and knowledge in different surroundings through 
different projects, constantly learning and remaining employable for a wide variety of projects.  
 
Software professionals need continuous skills and knowledge development to ensure they remain up 
to date, due to the expansion and rapidly changing nature of technology. Even Belgian high-tech 
workers, squarely in the group that scores high in the EPL and UIB index, who enjoy high 
employability, are required to be increasingly flexible to maintain their security, resulting in a high 
number of ICT professionals working as consultants in small firms on a project-by-project basis. Their 
work is governed by software development contracts in which vendors are hired to build a custom 
software solution for a customer. The vendor then sends  software developers on payroll out to this 
customer. During the present study 9 of the 25 people interviewed were working on this basis.  
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The key issue as regards job quality is the payment scheme for services rendered: is the customer 
paying a lump sum for the entire project, or is the consultancy firm paid by the day? In the former 
case the vendor puts pressure on the developers to spend as little time as possible on the project 
while fulfilling its technical and functional specifications so that all spare time covered by the lump 
sum becomes profit. In the latter case customers try to negotiate the lowest price per time unit 
possible and, according to our interviewees, prices can range from €300 to 1000 a day. This is a 
serious cost to the customers, who try to reduce it by imposing stringent and precise demands on the 
work promised by the consultancy firms and by carefully monitoring the work. The consultancy firms 
try to keep the price they get for hiring out their software workers as high as possible relative to these 
workers’ salaries in order to maximize profits. Often this means promising extra features that the 
worker then has to deliver. In effect, depending on the contractual arrangements between the two 
companies, workers experience pressure from different sources that affects their job quality.  
 
Despite being an apparently successful example of a sector where a labour shortage gives workers 
considerable individual bargaining power and a national framework that scores high on the EPL and 
UIB indices, the system produces some undesirable outcomes in terms of job quality, such as 
pressures at work and a lack of long-term career security and stability.  
Conclusion  
The initial findings from our three case studies demonstrate the organizational aspects of job security 
within the overall framework of employment security, and how these influence individual workers’ 
experience of job quality. The focus on two economic sectors – manufacturing and knowledge 
industries – in three European countries provided a diversity of contexts for examining job quality. This 
paper has outlined how organizations in general take advantage of countries’ employment regulations 
and use job security to adapt to market demands. It has also discussed the outcomes for the quality of 
jobs in the three different case studies.  
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The matrix presented in Table 1 shows that none of the country cases studied represent the flexicurity 
model – low levels of EPL together with high levels of UIB.  However, unlike flexicurity, market 
pressures are a widespread phenomenon influencing companies in each of the countries. At the 
organizational level the pressure for workforce flexibility can be seen in flexible contracts or constant 
pressure to upgrade skills. In each case, this negatively affects job quality, with different dynamics for 
different employee groups. The research shows incremental dualization of the workforce in 
manufacturing, with temporary workers more vulnerable and experiencing a reduction in their job 
quality, despite being covered by relatively strict employment security arrangements, which confirms 
the need to look at the organizational level when studying employment security. Even though this 
dualization was not found in our ICT sector case study, the changes driven by market pressures affect 
the job quality of the workers we interviewed. The case studies presented here show how the 
employment security system of each country affects the way job security is handled by employers and, 
in turn, the individual workers’ experience of job quality. 
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